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Cet article présente une critique de l’approche du Tribunal des droits de la personne de 
l’Ontario (TDPO) relativement à l’anonymisation des requêtes fondées sur le handicap. 
Premièrement, j’examine le critère d’obtention d’une ordonnance d’anonymat et 
l’application de ce critère par le TDPO. Le TDPO a établi uniformément que, dans les 
cas de divulgation d’un handicap dans une décision publique, l’importance de la 
transparence de la justice l’emporte sur les préoccupations d’un individu relativement à 
la vie privée, et ce, en l’absence de circonstances « uniques » ou « exceptionnelles ». Je 
traite de la preuve relevant des sciences sociales relative à la divulgation d’un handicap 
et de l’impact dissuasif potentiel de l’approche actuelle du TDPO en matière 
d’anonymisation sur les requérants handicapés. J’avance que le TDPO devrait ordonner 
l’anonymisation dans tous les cas fondés sur le handicap lorsque le requérant ou la 
requérante ne souhaite pas que son handicap soit révélé dans une décision du TDPO. 
J’esquisse la raison pour laquelle l’application actuelle du principe de transparence de la 
justice par le TDPO est mal adaptée à l’ère numérique. Je démontre également que ma 
proposition de réforme n’est pas déconnectée des pratiques courantes d’autres tribunaux 
ayant des mandats semblables, de tribunaux des droits de la personne d’autres 
juridictions, et d’une décision récente de la Cour suprême du Canada. Finalement, 
j’explore différentes options de réforme ainsi que les répercussions possibles de celles-
ci. 
 
This paper provides a critique of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario’s (HRTO) 
approach to the anonymization of applications brought on the ground of disability. First, 
I examine the test for obtaining an order for anonymity and the application of this test by 
the HRTO. The HRTO has consistently held that the importance of open justice 
outweighs an individual’s privacy concerns about disclosure of disability in a public 
decision unless there are "unique" or "exceptional" circumstances. I discuss social 
science evidence related to disclosure of disability and the potential deterring impact of 
the HRTO’s current approach to anonymization on applicants with disabilities. I argue 
that the HRTO should order anonymization in all cases advanced on the ground of 
disability when the applicant does not wish to disclose her/his disability in an HRTO 
decision. I outline why the HRTO’s current application of the open justice principle is 
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ill-suited for the digital age and demonstrate that my proposal for reform is not so 
disconnected from current practices used by other tribunals with similar mandates, 
human rights tribunals in other jurisdictions and a recent Supreme Court of Canada case. 
Finally, I discuss various options for reform as well as potential repercussions of these 
options.  
 
IMAGINE THAT YOU HAVE A VERY PRIVATE medical condition or disability. Maybe you 
have not even told some of your closest friends or family about it. You need accommodation at 
work or at school or from your landlord. When you obtain legal advice you are told you can ask 
your employer, your school, or your landlord for the accommodation you require and you have 
your doctor provide a letter outlining your limitations and restrictions. You are told that you do 
not have to tell your landlord, your employer, or your school about your diagnosis and that your 
landlord, employer, or school must keep the information about your disability private. For 
whatever reason you are denied the accommodation you require or you endure other 
discriminatory treatment related to your disability. You are told that you can fill out a human 
rights application. You ask if you can remain anonymous. You are advised that it is very difficult 
to access anonymous and redacted processes and that if you go forward with the application and 
the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario makes a written decision, there is a very high chance that 
the decision will reveal information about your disability and that the decision will not be 
anonymized. The written decision will be posted online on CanLII: a public database. What this 
means is that anyone can search your name in this database and learn about your disability. Do 
you decide to file the human rights application? Or do your concerns about disclosing your 
disability in the process outweigh the monetary or public interest remedies that you could obtain 
as a result? 
The issue of anonymity in human rights applications was discussed in the Report of the 
Ontario Human Rights Review 2012.
1
 Andrew Pinto, Chair of the Review, brought attention to a 
concern raised by disability advocates that the “very high bar set for anonymous and redacted 
processes” by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) system operates as a barrier to 
access for some individuals with disabilities, including mental health conditions.
2
 As Pinto notes, 
individuals with disabilities may choose not to pursue a human rights claim because they fear the 
stigma or negative consequences, which could result from a public decision disclosing their 
disability. As we shall see, the HRTO does protect the anonymity of applicants in some 
circumstances, such as in the case of minors. However, as Pinto points out, protecting anonymity 
routinely on the basis of some grounds protected by the Human Rights Code (Code), but only 
exceptionally where other grounds are in play, operates to create a hierarchy of protection.
3
 At 
the same time Pinto acknowledges that anonymization could feed “into the very stigma that the 
applicant is trying to avoid.”
4
  
In this article, I examine the test for obtaining an order for anonymity and how it has been 
applied by the HRTO. In the context of claims grounded in disability, the HRTO routinely holds 
                                                          
1
 Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General, Report of the Ontario Human Rights Review 2012, by Andrew Pinto 
(Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2012). 
2
 Ibid at 68. 
3









that the importance of open justice outweighs an individual’s privacy concerns about disclosure 
of disability in a public decision. I discuss social science evidence pertaining to the disclosure of 
disability and the potential deterrent impact of the HRTO’s current approach to anonymization of 
applicants in cases where the alleged ground is that of disability. I argue that the HRTO should 
order anonymization in all cases advanced on the ground of disability when the applicant does 
not wish to disclose her/his disability in a public decision published online on CanLII. My 
argument applies to all individuals with disabilities but may be especially relevant in cases of 
non-evident/invisible disabilities such as mental health or invisible physical disabilities where 
individuals make decisions to disclose their disabilities based on a variety of factors. This topic is 
especially relevant given the increasing importance of one’s online reputation in hiring decisions 
and the fact that human rights decisions can be accessed online. I outline why the HRTO’s 
current application of the open justice principle is ill-suited for the digital age. I demonstrate that 
my proposal for reform is not so disconnected from current practices used by other tribunals with 
similar mandates and human rights tribunals in other jurisdictions and a recent Supreme Court of 
Canada case. Finally, I discuss various options for reform as well as potential repercussions of 
these options. This article focuses on anonymity in human rights applications brought on the 
ground of disability. In my analysis I look at HRTO decisions related to all Code grounds and 
analyze the rationales provided by the HRTO for anonymizing or refusing to anonymize the 
identities of the applicants. My final recommendations, however, are intended to relate solely to 
the ground of disability. I leave the question of whether similar recommendations should be 
made in regards to other grounds protected under the Code to further research. I do not discuss 
whether or not anonymity should be granted when discrimination based on other grounds has a 
negative impact on an applicant’s mental or physical health. I also do not address the question of 





I. DIVERSITY WITHIN DISABILITY AND THE SOCIAL 
MODEL OF DISABILITY 
 
By pursuing this topic I am by no means suggesting that applicants should conceal or should 
want to conceal their disabilities or that applicants should feel stigmatized as a result of their 
disabilities. However, I do think that it is important for applicants with disabilities to have a 
choice to remain anonymous so that they retain control over the disclosure of their disabilities. I 
recognize that experiences of disability vary from individual to individual depending on a variety 
of factors and cannot be generalized. Factors may include when the disability was acquired and 
intersectionalities related to socio-economic status, education, gender, and race. The nature of the 
disability and whether it is an evident/visible or non-evident/invisible disability may also play a 
role in disclosure. Anonymity may be completely inappropriate for some applicants who may see 
disclosure of their disability in a written decision as an important part of combating stereotypes 
and discrimination. The experience of public disclosure could also be empowering for applicants 
                                                          
5
 See e.g. Teri Hibbs & Dianne Pothier, “Post-Secondary Education and Disabled Students: Mining a Level Playing 
Field or Playing in a Minefield?” in Dianne Pothier & Richard Devlin, eds, Critical Disability Theory: Essays in 
Philosophy, Politics, Policy and Law (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006) 195. 
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in some circumstances. This is why I advocate for a choice to disclose. I am motivated to write 
this article because I know that at least some individuals with disabilities experience difficulties 
in disclosing their disabilities, but this is not representative of all individuals with disabilities.   
I use the term “disability” and the phrase “person/individual with a disability” in this 
article. However, I recognize that “disability” is difficult to define and that there are differing 
opinions regarding which language is most appropriate to use to describe individuals with 
disabilities.
6
 The social model of disability, which highlights how structural barriers in society 
“disable” individuals, informs my understanding of disability. The social model of disability 
stands in contrast to the “orthodox personal tragedy view of disability,” in which individuals 
with disabilities are seen as “victims” of tragedies whose “individual medical impairments” are 
the cause of their “social and economic marginalization.”
7
 The argument I advance in this article 
is cognizant of the “structural forces, economic, political and cultural, that have created and 
continue to sustain disability.”
8
 It is my view that the difficulties that some individuals with 
disabilities experience with disclosure of their disabilities stem from the same “disabling” 




II. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
  
As a part of my research I read all seventy-two HRTO decisions which include the terms 
“anonymity or anonymization” and which were decided between 13 May 2011 and 1 August 
2013. The purpose of this search strategy was to determine the general trends (over 
approximately the last two year period when the research was conducted) in issuing orders for 
anonymity for all grounds. I also read all HRTO decisions that use the terms “anonymization or 
anonymity and disability” (no date restriction) in order to examine trends in anonymity related to 
disability specifically which is the focus of this article. This search was current as of 11 March 
2014.
10
 I noted that the terms anonymity and anonymization did not narrow in on all cases 
related to anonymity and I broadened my search to include three separate searches (with no date 
restrictions). These three searches were current as of 1 August 2013. A search of “publication 
ban” yielded forty-two results. I then read all decisions citing Rule “3.11” or Rule “3.12” of the 
HRTO’s Rules of Procedure. The two searches on 3.11 and 3.12 identified only one new case. 
Other cases that were not identified directly through these five search strategies are also 
                                                          
6
 ARCH Disability Law Centre, “The Law As it Affects Persons With Disabilities” (1September 2009) at 2–5, 
online: <archdisabilitylaw.ca/?q=law-it-affects-persons-disabilities> [perma.cc/D5TE-LY9E]; Lennard J Davis, ed, 
The Disability Studies Reader, 4th ed (New York: Routledge, 2013); Corbett Joan O’Toole, “Disclosing Our 
Relationships to Disabilities: An Invitation for Disability Studies Scholars” (2013) 33:2 Disability Studies Q, online: 
<dsq-sds.org/article/view/3708/3226> [perma.cc/KDA3-9LUW]; Richard Devlin & Dianne Pothier, “Introduction: 
Toward a Critical Theory of Dis-Citizenship” in Dianne Pothier & Richard Devlin, eds, Critical Disability Theory: 
Essays in Philosophy, Politics, Policy and Law (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006) at 3 [“Introduction”]; Michael Oliver 
& Colin Barnes, The New Politics of Disablement (Basingstoke: Palgrave McMillan, 2012) at 15;  Nicola Martin, 
“Disability Identity – disability pride” (2014) 16:1 Perspectives 14. 
7
 Oliver & Barnes, supra note 6 at 15, 51; Martin, supra note 6. 
8




 I extended the time period for this search from 1 August 2013 to 11 March 2014 to determine if the HRTO’s 
treatment of anonymity and disability issues had evolved over time.  
112





referenced throughout the article.
11
 A point of further research would have been to use the search 
terms “confidentiality and disability” to further broaden the search, but this was beyond the 
parameters of this article given the 248 hits that this search generated as of 1 August 2013.  
Of the twenty-seven cases which were brought on the ground of disability (more than one 
ground may have been identified) that I identified through these searches, full or partial 
anonymity was granted in fourteen cases. The twenty-seven cases include only those where a 
decision was made on the issue of anonymization in an interim decision or final decision about 
the applicant’s human rights application. This number does not include the two cases I found 
where applicants tried to redact information contained in HRTO decisions after the fact, through 
requests for Reconsideration or for Order During Proceeding (wherein both cases the 
respondents did not make submissions on anonymization). Out of the fourteen cases where 
anonymity was granted, respondents opposed anonymity in two cases and consented to 
anonymity in seven cases. Of the thirteen cases in which anonymity was not granted, the 
respondents opposed anonymity in five cases. In the remainder of cases no submissions were 
made, the respondent did not object to anonymization, or information about the respondent’s 
position was not included in the decision. 
The research I conducted in relation to the practice of other tribunals and human rights 
tribunals in other jurisdictions was conducted by looking at tribunal websites and rules, and by 
conducting a high level analysis of the relevant Tribunals’ decisions.
12
 In order to remain 
consistent with the recommendations of this article, I have anonymized the names of applicants 
in all citations in this article which are not already anonymized.   
My analysis is also informed by my experience working at the Human Rights Legal 
Support Centre (HRLSC) as a part of Osgoode Hall Law School’s Anti-Discrimination Intensive 
Program (ADIP) in 2013. Conversations during the course of the Intensive program with 
colleagues, including lawyers, staff and other ADIP students have informed the views I take 
here. My article also contains information learned through conversations with Laurie Letheren in 
the course of collaborating together on this topic.
13
 At the time Letheren was a staff lawyer with 
ARCH Disability Law Centre (ARCH) 
 
III. IMPORTANT TERMS EXPLAINED 
 
For the purpose of this article, the term anonymization or anonymity is used in circumstances 
where the applicant is not identified in a written court or tribunal decision. This may involve 
using a pseudonym or the initials of the applicant in the written decision and avoiding the use of 
other identifying information. HRTO jurisprudence surrounding anonymization, partial 
publication bans, and publication bans overlap as they seek to address similar privacy concerns.
14
  
                                                          
11
 These cases include those which were referenced in the HRTO decisions that were captured by my search 
strategy. One case was brought to my attention by a staff member at the HRLSC. 
12
 The anonymization trends of other tribunals remain an area for further research.   
13
 Laurie Letheren, personal communications (2013-2014). Letheren and I co-authored a paper on this subject for the 
Ontario Bar Association entitled: “Open Court and Confidentiality: Can there be a Balance in Light of our New 
Media Age?” in 2014. That paper cited an earlier unpublished version of this article.   
14
 August v Richland Marketing Inc, 2003 CanLII 25 (HRTO) [August]; H v O, 2003 CanLII 6 at para 2 (HRTO) [H 
v O]; V v E, 2011 CanLII 1230 at para 10 (HRTO) [V v E]. 
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A publication ban is when a court or tribunal orders that certain information in a court or 
tribunal proceeding cannot be published, “curtail[ing] the freedom of expression of third 
parties.”
15
 A partial publication ban on an applicant’s identity “restrict[s] the publication of the 
applicant’s name by anyone in attendance at a hearing or with knowledge of the matter.”
16
 It is a 
partial publication ban because it only bans the publication of the applicant’s identity. 
Anonymization orders do not restrict what others can publish.
17
 Notwithstanding their distinct 
meaning, on occasion the terms publication ban and anonymization have been used 
interchangeably by the HRTO.
18
 
The highest level of secrecy, available in rare circumstances, is a closed hearing. HRTO 
hearings are open to the public unless the HRTO is,  
 
of the opinion that … intimate financial or personal matters or other matters may be 
disclosed at the hearing of such a nature, having regard to the circumstances, that the 
desirability of avoiding disclosure thereof in the interests of any person affected or in 
the public interest outweighs the desirability of adhering to the principle that hearings 
be open to the public, 
 




IV. HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL: THE TEST FOR 
ANONYMITY   
 
According to Rule 3.11 of the HRTO’s Rules of Procedure, the Tribunal “may make an order to 
protect the confidentiality of personal or sensitive information where it considers it appropriate 
to do so.”
20
 The HRTO’s practice is to,  
 
consider any request to keep the name of a party or other information confidential as 
an exception to the general principle that the Tribunal’s process should be open and 
transparent in accordance with the province’s legal system. The Tribunal therefore 
needs to be satisfied that the applicant’s request to anonymize [his or her] identity 




The HRTO’s rationale in CM v York Region has been continually cited in the HRTO 
jurisprudence when determining whether or not to order anonymity.
22
   
 
                                                          
15
 Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corp, [1994] 3 SCR 835 at 879.  
16




 H v N, 2012 CanLII 810 at para 13 (HRTO) [H v N]; SS v Taylor, 2012 CanLII 1839 (HRTO) [SS]. 
19
 Statutory Powers Procedure Act, RSO 1990, c S-22, s 9(1). 
20
 Human Rights Code Rules of Procedure, RSO 1990, c H-19, s 3.11 [Rules of Procedure].  
21
 V v V, 2012 CanLII 1011 at para 15 (HRTO) [V v V].  
22
 W v C, 2011 CanLII 1234 (HRTO); D v H, 2013 CanLII 1393 (HRTO) [D v H]; V v V, supra note 21. 
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An open justice system is a fundamental principle of a free and democratic society, 
so that the actions of those responsible for interpreting and enforcing the law may be 
subject to public scrutiny. Moreover, the principles enshrined in the Code are quasi-
constitutional rights which are recognized as particularly significant in Canadian 
society. It is important for there to be public scrutiny when respondents [are] found 
to have violated these rights and also when accusations of discrimination are made 
by applicants but not upheld. I agree with the respondents that it is a serious matter to 
be accused of breaching the Code, which may also cause stress and stigma. Without 
good reasons for doing so, parties should not make or defend allegations from behind 
a veil of anonymity, assured that they will not be identified if they are found not 
credible, their allegations are rejected or they are held to have violated the Code. 
Effective public scrutiny of this human rights system depends, in part, upon knowing 
how the Tribunal addresses the particular parties before it. Openness and free 




The test to decide whether or not to issue an order for anonymity involves balancing the interest 
in an open justice system (as laid out in CM v York Region) and the applicant’s reasons for 
requesting anonymity on a case-by-case basis. Parties seeking publication bans or anonymization 
have the onus of “proving there is a real and substantial risk that would justify that level of 
confidentiality.”
24
 The onus on an applicant requesting anonymization is “less onerous” than for 
a publication ban which “places restrictions on what others may do and directly infringes their 
expressive freedom.”
25
 The HRTO has held that it “does recognize the sensitive nature of some 
of the medical evidence provided in its cases, and [its] decisions strive to minimize unnecessary 




V. THE APPLICATION OF THE TEST IN ONTARIO 
 
My review of the case law reveals that the HRTO routinely orders anonymity in cases for 
applicants who are minors, and that the HRTO has been sympathetic to arguments asking for 
anonymization of the applicant (or partial publication bans) when the case relates to sexual 
harassment, gender identity, or sexual orientation. The HRTO is reluctant to order anonymity or 
partial publication bans in other circumstances. 
 
A. MINORS  
 
Anonymity was ordered for all cases involving minors or cases consolidated with the application 
of a minor.
27
 This is in accordance with Rule 3.11.1 of the HRTO’s Rules of Procedure where 
                                                          
23
 CM supra note 16 at para 20. 
24
 H v N, supra note 18 at para 13.  
25
 CM, supra note 16 at para 25. 
26
 L v O, 2010 CanLII 1909 at para 19 (HRTO) [L v O]. 
27
 TB v Halton District School Board, 2013 CanLII HRTO 304 (HRTO); AG v Taylor Statten Camp Company Ltd, 
2012 CanLII 1449 (HRTO); NM v Ottawa-Carleton District School Board, 2012 CanLII 282 (HRTO); AW v Ottawa 
International Soccer Club, 2011 CanLII 915 (HRTO); BC v London Police Services Board, 2011 CanLII 1644 
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B. SEXUAL HARASSMENT  
 
The HRTO ordered anonymity in six of seven cases of sexual harassment in the past two years in 
the period of my research. Three of seven were cases involving minors and decided on that 
basis.
29
 Another was decided on the basis of gender.
30
 Of the three remaining cases, anonymity 
was ordered in two.
31
 GG involved a parallel criminal trial for sexual assault.
32
 In SS v Taylor, 
the applicant argued that,  
 
… her privacy and dignity interests favour the requested anonymization … that the 
highly graphic, explicit and personal comments at issue are particularly humiliating 
and have on-going repercussions for her self-confidence, her sense of self-worth, and 
her relationships with others. To disclose her name or other identifying information 





In this case the HRTO was satisfied that this was an important objective.
34
  Adjudicator 
Flaherty ruled that if, “the Tribunal did not protect the identity of applicants in proceedings of 
such a personal and intimate nature, they may be less willing to pursue allegations of sexual 
harassment in such circumstances.”
35
 This result, she concluded, would be inconsistent with the 
purpose of the Code.36 As the applicant requested anonymity and did not request a private 
hearing or that the decision itself not be accessible to the public, adjudicator Flaherty decided 
that a partial publication ban “appropriately balance[d] the salutary and deleterious effects of 
anonymization.”37  
The HRTO has left open the possibility that there would be circumstances in which it 
would not order anonymity in cases of sexual harassment.
38
 B v H was brought on the grounds of 
sex, reprisal, and threat of reprisal. The applicant also argued that the matter related to “serious 
allegations of sexual harassment.”
39
 Vice-Chair Doyle held that, “while the Tribunal has 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(HRTO) [BC]; SR v Drewlo Holdings, 2011 CanLII 2003 (HRTO); AD v Club Cranberry Vacations Inc, 2011 
CanLII 2134 (HRTO); SH v Subway 2185559 Ontario Inc, 2011 CanLII 1575 (HRTO) [S.H.]; EH v Subway 
2185559 Ontario Inc, 2011 CanLII 1574 (HRTO) [E.H]. 
28
 Rules of Procedure, supra note 20, s 3.11.1. 
29
 SH, supra note 27; EH, supra note 27; BC, supra note 27. 
30
 KM v Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre, 2012 CanLII 1505 (HRTO) [KM]. 
31
 GG v 1489024 Ontario Ltd, 2012 CanLII 824 (HRTO) [GG]; SS, supra note 18; KM, supra note 30; B v H, 2012 
CanLII 212 (HRTO) [B v H]. 
32
 Supra note 31. 
33
 Supra note 18 at para 41. 
34








 GG, supra note 31 at para 8; B v H, supra note 31 at para 1. 
39
 B v H, supra note 31 at para 34.   
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anonymized certain decisions in matters where there are allegations of sexual harassment, not 
every decision involving such allegations has been anonymized.  The mere fact, then, that this 
Application alleges sexual harassment does not automatically trigger anonymization.”
40
 In this 
case Vice-Chair Doyle held that there were not special circumstances which outweighed the 
importance of the openness of the HRTO process.
41
  
Although the HRTO has not issued orders for anonymity in all cases of sexual harassment, 
HRTO jurisprudence constantly references sexual harassment cases as examples of cases which 
warrant an exception to the open justice principle. This is demonstrated through the often cited 
passage from V v E: “Publication bans and anonymization orders have been issued in certain 
types of human rights cases, such as those involving minors or highly personal or sensitive 




C. SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
 
A partial publication ban was ordered in a case where an individual bringing a sexual harassment 
case did not want to disclose her or her partner’s sexual orientation.
43
 The HRTO held that the 
“nature of sexual harassment cases, which is compounded by the societal stigma attached to 
same-gender relationships arguably, put the Complainant’s dignity and privacy interests directly 
at stake if her identity and her partner’s identity [were] divulged.”44 
 
D. GENDER IDENTITY 
 
Anonymity was ordered in KM v Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre where the applicant was 
transgendered, as “should the applicant be publically identified as a transsexual that would 
significantly compromise his ability to live as a man and could expose him to ‘social stigma and 
prejudice in our society.’’’
45
 The KM decision cited the XY decision from 2010, a case in which a 
partial publications ban had been ordered where the applicant was transgendered.
46
 An interim 
partial publication ban was also granted to one member of a group who brought an application 
against the Ministry of Health and Long Term Care for termination of OHIP services because 




E. RELATED CRIMINAL TRIAL 
 
                                                          
40




 Supra note 14 at para 10. See also H v N, supra note 18 at para 13, H v R, 2012 CanLII 2304 at para 6 (HRTO) [H 
v R], M v N, 2013 CanLII 974 at para 5 (HRTO) [M v N]. 
43
 August, supra note 14. 
44
 Ibid at para 11. 
45
Supra note 30 at para 8. 
46
 XY v Ontario (Government and Consumer Services), 2010 CanLII 1906 (HRTO) [XY].  
47
 H v O, supra note 14 at para 2.  
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Forms of anonymity were ordered for all cases in which there was a related criminal trial and 
anonymity had been ordered at the criminal trial.
48
 Anonymity was also ordered in one sexual 
harassment case where the related criminal decision for sexual assault suggested that there would 




F. RACE/ ETHNIC ORIGIN/ COLOUR/ ANCESTRY/ CITIZENSHIP/ 
CREED/ PLACE OF ORIGIN/ REPRISAL  
 
In instances where applicants alleged the grounds of race, ethnic origin, creed, place of origin or 
ethnic origin, or raised reprisal, the HRTO cited the open justice principle as outweighing the 
individual’s interest in anonymity or a publication ban.
50
 Among these cases is one where an 
applicant raised concerns about his personal safety and reprisal for making a complaint against a 
provincial jail on the grounds of “race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, citizenship and ethnic 
origin.”
51
 The applicant grounded these concerns in the institutional culture of Ontario’s prison 
facilities, a culture which he asserted was “intolerant of Black inmates and employees, especially 
those that complain of racism.”
52
 Yet, Vice-Chair Bhabha concluded that on a balance of 






The HRTO does not order anonymity in all cases related to disability. Anonymity was granted in 
two cases where the applicants brought applications because they had faced discrimination due 
to their HIV positive status.
54
 In BAS the respondents consented to anonymity. In BAS the 
applicant made arguments regarding the “heavy burden of stigma and discrimination” 
experienced by individuals who have been diagnosed with HIV. In BAS, the applicant also raised 
how disclosure could cause “significant negative consequences in his life.”
55
 In the DM case the 
respondent consented to the applicant’s request to be identified in the decision by a pseudonym 
and a limited publication ban but the HRTO did not provide a rationale for its decision to order 
anonymity aside from referencing the XY case discussed in the above section on gender 
identity.
56
    
Anonymity was ordered in SD v Grand River Hospital on the motion of Vice-Chair 
Bhattacharjee.
57
 The respondents consented to the applicant’s request that the applicant’s patient 
chart be sealed and the Vice-Chair ordered anonymization on his own motion to “protect the 
                                                          
48
 SM v Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services), 2012 CanLII 1460 (HRTO); AB v Toronto Police 
Services Board, 2013 CanLII 447 (HRTO); GG, supra note 31. 
49
GG, supra note 31 at para 9. 
50
 K v T, 2012 CanLII 1374 (HRTO); TF v McDonald’s Restaurants of Canada, 2011 CanLII 2103 (HRTO) [TF]. 
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integrity of the sealing order.”
58
 In this case the applicant was brought to the hospital by police 
because she was experiencing a mental health crisis and she was treated as a “psychiatric out-
patient.”
59
 The applicant alleged that the respondent had discriminated against her through 
entries made in her patient chart and in her treatment.
60
 In this case the Tribunal held that 
although orders for anonymization are “rare and extraordinary steps because of the importance of 
openness and transparency in legal proceedings … because of the stigma attached to mental 
illness and the fact that the entries from the chart are of an extremely personal and sensitive 
nature,” this case was an “exceptional” case with a “narrow and overriding need” for protection 
of the applicant’s privacy interests.
61
 Anonymization and a partial publication ban were both 
ordered in JM v St Joseph’s Health Care.
62
 The applicant asserted that she had been 
discriminated against by medical personnel due to her mental health disability when they 
followed her to her home and harassed her when she refused a mental health assessment, and 
when a doctor reported to the Ministry of Transportation that she was “suspect[ed] of suffering 
from mental illness.”
63
 The applicant requested anonymization because, “the possible disclosure 
of her mental health records would pose a real and substantial risk to her dignity and privacy 
rights [relying] on the stigma that may affect one who is labelled mentally ill.”
64
 In addition, the 
applicant also maintained that her future medical care could be adversely impacted by disclosure 
of her name. She argued that she had “a reasonable belief” that her care could be impacted 
because the hospital staff had expressed “dismay over the applicant filing [other] complaints.”
65
 
Furthermore, the applicant argued that open justice principles would not be “interfered with” 
because the case “[would] still be adjudicated in an open hearing.”
66
 When an interim decision 
regarding jurisdictional issues described the applicant’s depression and “suicidal ideation,” 
anonymity was granted for the interim decision with the possibility that the issue of anonymity 
would be revisited at a later date.
67
  
Anonymity was ordered when an applicant was being stalked in AB v Timbercreek Asset 
Management.
68
 AB raised concerns about her stigmatizing medical condition and receipt of 
disability benefits, however, these were not the reasons considered by the HRTO in deciding to 
order anonymity.
69
 Vice-Chair Doyle was satisfied that because the applicant’s application was 
regarding her housing and “given the concern that a decision may make a reference to her or her 
housing situation which would make it easier for her stalker to locate her” that an order of 
anonymity was warranted.
70
 In the case of TA v 60 Montclair, the HRTO similarly ordered 
anonymity because the applicant had a stalker, but did not comment on whether the applicant’s 
medical conditions or receipt of public assistance were also sufficient reasons to order 
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 XY v Housing Connections (a case in which the applicant was  receiving Ontario 
Disability Support Program benefits, and had multiple sclerosis and environmental sensitivities) 
was decided on a similar basis, with the issue of the safety of the applicant who was in an 
abusive relationship grounding the granting of anonymity.
72
  
Anonymity was also ordered in UN v Tarion Warranty Corporation where the applicant 
was concerned about disclosing sensitive information about her disability (exacerbated by 
sensitivity to loud noise) and the impact it has on her lifestyle.
73
 In this case the respondents 
consented to anonymity.
74
 In a case which “alleged discriminatory disclosure of highly personal 
information” occurred during the completion of police reference checks under the Mental Health 
Act, anonymity was ordered because the circumstances were characterized as “exceptional” 
where it was appropriate to order anonymity.
75
 
A concern about disclosing Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and anxiety was not 
enough in V v V.
76
 In that case the applicant sought an anonymization order because the 
proceeding would,  
 
include evidence relating to the impact on her mental health of living in the 
apartment and evidence that she has been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress 
disorder. The applicant … will be presenting evidence relating to the anxiety she 
suffered, and that the evidence will include “extremely personal and sensitive 




Similarly, in H v R, a concern regarding disclosure of a private medical condition and 
information about an applicant’s disability was not enough for the HRTO to issue an order for 
anonymization.
78
 A concern about revealing an “alleged medical condition” in a public decision 
was not sufficient in another.
79
 In a creed and perceived disability case where the applicant made 
serious allegations—as well as potentially discriminatory comments—against the respondents, 
anonymity was not ordered because the interest of the applicant’s anonymity did not outweigh 
the open justice principle.
80
 A concern about an undisclosed disability which could cause 
stigmatization paired with an uncommon name was also insufficient for the granting of 
anonymity.
81
 In this case, Vice-Chair Debané drew attention to the fact that the applicant did 
“not even refer to the nature” of the disability and found there were no reasons for anonymity 
and no “exceptional circumstances.”
82
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The HRTO did not anonymize an applicant’s identity where the applicant was concerned 
that disclosure of his disability would have an impact on his future employment opportunities.
83
 
Vice-Chair Overend held: 
 
the applicant notes that there is ‘a potential risk to his ability to secure future 
employment if it becomes known that he is disabled.’  Again, despite the fact that 
many of the applications to this Tribunal involve applicants with disabilities, the 
Tribunal has not anonymized their identity, even though many of them would be 
seeking future employment. The risk identified by the applicant is too speculative 
and does not outweigh the principle of openness that governs this Tribunal.
84
   
 
Rationales provided by the HRTO when refusing to issue an order for anonymity in regards to 
disability or private medical information are quite consistent. As discussed above, anonymity 
was denied in V v V (PTSD and anxiety) because it was not sufficiently similar to the exceptional 
case of SD v Grand River Hospital (mental health crisis).
85
 Three recent cases have provided a 




The details disclosed about the applicant’s medical condition are not of the nature or 
degree of private or intimate information present in those cases where 
bans/anonymity have been ordered. Almost all disability human rights cases involve 
some disclosure of personal information surrounding an applicant’s disability, or the 
basis for the perceived disability, in order to meet the definition in section 10 of the 
Code and establish that there is a Code-protected ground. The applicant did not 
articulate any unique concerns or issues of confidentiality surrounding her condition 




H v R and M v N both cite V v E while providing similar reasons for refusing to issue an 
order for anonymity.
88
 This rationale is consistent with HRTO jurisprudence, which 
stresses that there has been no “blanket rule ordering any type of confidentiality for 
applicants with disabilities.”
89
  This is also the case for individuals with mental health 
disabilities as a,  
 
general claim that there is still a stigma associated with mental illness is insufficient. 
Human rights proceedings are often difficult for all involved, most particularly 
applicants … . It is also routine that some evidence of the emotional consequences of 
alleged discrimination is heard, indeed the Code calls for such evidence when 
determining the appropriate remedy when it speaks of damages for injury to dignity, 
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This survey of HRTO decisions partially lines up with the HRTO’s draft Practice 
Direction from January 2014 which outlines how orders for anonymization are “only made in 
exceptional circumstances” except in the cases of minors.
91
 The HRTO Practice Direction 
provides examples of exceptional circumstances, including “threats to personal safety,” “acute 
mental health crisis,” and when there is a related criminal proceeding for sexual assault.
92
 
However the Practice Direction does not make mention other past examples from the 
jurisprudence, such as disclosure of HIV status, gender identity, or sexual orientation, or cases of 
sexual harassment not involving a criminal proceeding.  
 
VI. CONCERNS ABOUT DISCLOSURE OF DISABILITY 
 
As set out above, the HRTO orders anonymity in applications brought on the ground of disability 
only in “exceptional” cases. In this section, I will turn to the question of whether the HRTO’s 
approach to anonymization is appropriate given the difficulties that some individuals with 
disabilities face with disclosure of their disabilities in other contexts. ARCH made a submission 
to the Pinto review, stating that “threat of disclosure of ... disability may dissuade Applicants 
with meritorious complaints from seeking redress from [the] HRTO.”
93
 While there are no 
empirical studies that have examined the specific question of whether current HRTO practices 
dissuade applications from pursuing human rights applications, the body of social science 
evidence on disclosure gives us very good reasons to believe that human rights applicants may 
be deterred from bringing applications because of concerns about their disabilities being 
disclosed in an online decision. 
In an ideal world, individuals with disabilities would never be concerned about disclosing 
their disabilities and they would never be mistreated as a result. Unfortunately, this is not the 
world in which we live. The HRLSC, for example, consistently receives a high percentage of 
calls citing disability as the ground of discrimination for inquiry.
94
 Although not indicative of the 
number of meritorious human rights claims related to disability, applications on the ground of 
disability make up the majority of human rights applications.
95
 Disclosure of disability can have 
real repercussions in varied contexts. Individuals with mental health disabilities face stigma and 
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systemic discrimination as outlined in the Human Rights Commission’s report, Minds That 
Matter.
96
 The Commission notes that individuals expressed their reluctance to disclose their 
disability because they, “feared discrimination or their performance being judged on the basis of 
their disability, instead of their contributions at work.”
97
 Some were also concerned that 
disclosure could impact their eligibility for life insurance.
98
 Additionally, concerns about 
disclosure were often due to experiences facing discrimination or termination from employment 
after disclosure of their disability.
99
 The Minds That Matter report documents as well how 
concerns about disclosure arise in the legal context, referencing the conclusion of one court 
representative who felt that individuals with mental health disabilities were uncomfortable 
disclosing their disabilities to their court representatives, let alone discussing their disability 
publicly in court.
100
 Even individuals who came forward to speak about their experiences for the 
purpose of the Minds That Matter report were “reluctant to disclose their identities” for 
publication in the report “due to concerns about negative attitudes and stereotypes.”
101
 Similarly, 
the Kirby report “cites surveys that show that between one-third and one-half of people with 
mental illnesses report being turned down for a job for which they were qualified, experienced 
dismissal, or were forced to resign.”
102
 As a Mental Health Commission of Canada publication 
outlines,  
 
[f]ear of being exposed as a person who lives with mental illness is a significant 
factor that explains why structural stigma remains unchallenged ... . Many people 
chose to conceal their mental illness out of fear of being exposed to numerous 
exclusionary processes. For instance, a person who unveils their mental illness in one 
life domain (e.g., seeking job accommodations) opens themselves up to additional 




There is a vast body of social science literature examining concerns about disclosure of 
disability, as analyzed by Wilton in the context of the workplace:  
 
[d]isclosure is frequently cited as a concern, and anxiety about the potential for 
discrimination and dismissal coupled with concerns about loss or renegotiation of 
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identity lead people to conceal conditions where possible. People may believe that 
their impairment places them at a disadvantage relative to non-disabled applicants … 
and this belief is substantiated by experiences where attempts at disclosure have 




A particular study focusing on the experiences of workers in Hamilton, Ontario confirms 
that individuals with disabilities may choose not to disclose their disabilities depending on 
factors such as the work environment, whether the workplace is unionized, and past experiences 
with disclosure.
105
 Sometimes individuals chose not to disclose and forwent accommodation at a 
personal cost because they did not feel that they were in a safe space to disclose.
106
 For 
individuals with non-evident disabilities, “the choice to disclose was complex and often centred 
on their perception of employers’ likely reactions to the information.”
107
 Individuals with 
psychiatric disabilities were the least likely to disclose in the workplace.
108
 In another study, 35 
per cent of professional managerial workers who disclosed their psychiatric conditions at work 
regretted disclosure.
109
 A further study which surveyed individuals with invisible disabilities 
found that 40 per cent did not “disclose freely” in their workplace and 36 per cent did not 
“disclose freely” in a post-secondary education context.
110
 By not disclosing their disabilities, 38 
per cent did not access accommodation in that particular context.
111
 
 In this section I have provided only a very brief look at some of the issues that some 
individuals with disabilities face with disclosure. There is a wealth of literature on the topic of 
disability disclosure including literature related to the disclosure of certain types of disabilities 
and related to disclosure in specific settings (e.g. in post-secondary institutions). The take home 
message is that individuals with disabilities make decisions to disclose their disabilities based on 
a variety of factors including their perceived vulnerability to social and economic 
marginalization and consequences (such as job loss or facing stigma). An individual may choose 
to disclose in some contexts and not others and an individual’s approach towards disclosure in 
these contexts can vary over time.
112
 The amount of information provided about the disability 
can also vary (e.g. a tenant’s choice to provide a medical note outlining limitations and 
restrictions to a landlord for accommodation compared to disclosing the diagnosis).   
No doubt, in the absence of empirical data it is difficult to assess whether or not 
applicants with disabilities are deterred from filing a human rights application because they do 
not want their disability to be disclosed publicly. However, this extensive literature on disability 
disclosure generally gives us good reason to surmise that this indeed may be the effect. 
Moreover, my experience at the HRLSC, and that of my colleague Laurie Letheren at ARCH, 
lends further support to this hypothesis. Potential applicants ask both ARCH and the HRLSC 
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about anonymity, and weigh it in the balance in deciding whether to proceed with the 
application.   
 
At ARCH, we hear from many employees with disabilities that they fear disclosing 
their disability and exercising their right to have their disability-related needs 
accommodated out of concern that they will [lose] their job or be stigmatized in the 
workplace as a result. 
 
We have been advised by law school and graduate students who are seeking advice 
on the schools’ obligation to accommodate their disability-related needs that they 
would not file an HRTO application out of fear that the fact of their disability could 
be accessed by law firms, fellow students or school department heads. Often their 





Applicants may consider that the respondents already know their identity and feel therefore that 
not much is gained by anonymization and others may in fact wish to have her/his name published 
in a public decision.  
ARCH has conversations with potential applicants about whether the benefits of the 
human rights process outweigh the potential negative consequences, including how bringing a 
human rights case can impact their future career and employment prospects.
114
 This can include 
both the implications of being a whistleblower and that the decision would reveal the applicant’s 
disability. In cases related to disability, often one’s entire medical record is processed, and the 
applicant retains very little control over how much of the medical record will be looked at or 
included in the written decision.
115
 Cases related to mental health especially tend to go into very 
personal details and symptomology.
116
  
With the low general damages awards (especially in cases for services and disability) and 
the current state of public interest awards provided through the HRTO process (typically Human 
Rights 101
117
), for many applicants the benefits of the human rights process do not outweigh the 
costs.
118
 In the 40 decisions in which the HRTO awarded remedies between May 2011 and May 
2012, public interest remedies for the most part consisted of human rights training or policy 
creation. No remedies were particularly creative.
119
 Given the recent decision in Moore, the 
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HRTO is also not encouraged to formulate creative public interest remedies in the near future.
120
 
In Moore, a case about the cancellation of a special education program, the Supreme Court of 
Canada (SCC) upheld the decision of the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal (BCHRT) in 
part, ordering that the School District pay for the cost of Moore’s schooling and damages.
121
 The 
SCC did not uphold the orders against the School District and the Ministry of Education for a 
wide range of systemic remedies.
122
  
Another downside of the human rights system is that there is a risk that an applicant’s 
disability may be disclosed in a written decision prior to a full hearing.
123
 Often the first move by 
the respondent is to request a summary hearing. A summary hearing “may be ordered when it 
appears there may be no reasonable prospect that the application or a part of the application can 
succeed.”
 124
 The applicant is given an opportunity to clarify the allegations in their application 
and then the Tribunal Member determines whether or not to dismiss some or all of the 
application.
125
 Even if one survives the summary hearing process, one’s disability may be 
disclosed in an interim decision. Interim decisions can be made prior, during, or after a hearing 
to decide on procedural issues or part of an application (“for instance, whether some of the 
allegations are untimely”).
126
 For example, procedurally a party may be removed or the question 
of whether or not anonymization will be ordered may be decided. What this means for the 
purpose of this article is that an applicant may lose a potential benefit of a private settlement 
because the applicant can no longer negotiate a non-disclosure clause in the minutes of 
settlement which would prevent disclosure of these sensitive details.
127
 
 Another related problem is that not all applicants are aware that the act of filing a human 
rights application may result in a public decision available online or that anonymous or redacted 
processes are even available.
128
 This is not surprising given that most applicants are self-
represented.
129
 Sometimes applicants learned that these decisions are posted online after the fact, 
at which point it is difficult to redact the information.
130
 This is demonstrated through two cases 
where the HRTO was reluctant to redact sensitive information from HRTO decisions when 
applicants sought to redact information after the decisions were published. In J v T, the HRTO 
found that the “information was necessary to meaningfully explain the reasoning in the decision” 
including information related to the applicant’s disability.
131
 In another case, the HRTO would 
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not redact public online decisions which contained private employment and health 
information.
132
 The HRTO pointed to the Rules of Procedure and the declaration signed by the 
applicant as a part of submitting the human rights application.
133
 The declaration at the time 
stated, “I understand that information about my Application can become public at a hearing, in a 
written decision, or in other ways determined by Tribunal policies,” and the application states, 
“Do not sign your Application until you are sure you understand what you are declaring here.”
134
 
However, Rule 3.12 (which states that all HRTO decisions are available to the public) and the 
declaration do not mention that the decisions made by the HRTO will be posted online. 
 In sum, there is good reason to be concerned about whether applicants are deterred from 
filing human rights applications as a result of the high bar for anonymous and redacted 
processes. Applicants must weigh the potential benefits and negative repercussions of the 
process. The benefits, given the low damage awards, lack of creative public interest remedies 
and the risk of disclosure of one’s disability before a private settlement, may not outweigh the 
costs. Given the social science literature surrounding disclosure, even if applicants have decided 
to proceed with an application because it is “worth it” overall, disclosure of one’s disability is a 
high transaction cost for an applicant to factor into their cost-benefit analysis.   
 
VIII. CURRENT SAFEGUARDS 
 
HRTO decisions cited on CanLII do have some protection from today’s powerful search engines 
such as Google. CanLII uses a “recognized web robot exclusion protocol.”
135
 This means that 
CanLII “prohibits external search engines from indexing the text and case name of decisions 
published on its website,” with the exception of Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) decisions.
136
 
However, CanLII cannot control the actions of third parties. If a third party creates a link to a 
CanLII decision on a page over which CanLII does not have control, then the text from the link 
could be “indexed by external search engines.”
137
 Decision text can easily be copied and pasted 
and PDF versions of the decisions can be saved and circulated. 
 
IX. THE OPEN COURTS PRINCIPLE AND LITIGATION IN 
THE DIGITAL AGE 
 
The test for anonymity requires that the applicant demonstrate that her/his concerns for 
anonymity outweigh any negative impacts on the “open justice system.”
138
 The importance of an 
“open justice system” derives from the “open courts principle.”  In what follows below I explore 
whether the “open courts principle” as currently applied is appropriate for the human rights 
system, whether the principle is properly applied by the HRTO, and whether the principle has 
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been engaged by the HRTO in a manner that factors in the digital age.   
 




In this section, I will focus on online court and tribunal decisions. However, I will draw on the 
broader literature that discusses court records generally when appropriate. Identifying 
information disclosed in other types of court records, such as pleadings, online raises many of 
the same concerns as identifying information in online court and tribunal decisions.   
Academics have raised the issue of the degree to which privacy interests should be 
recognized in online court records systems. Those who advocate for the availability of court 
records online argue that online records enable lawyers to save time and money.
140
 CanLII 
allows easy access to information which is helpful for lawyers working on limited budgets (such 
as those representing applicants), as well as for applicants who are required to self-represent. 
This is especially important in a regime where applicants frequently are self-represented (54% 
self-represented at mediation, 53% at hearing), whereas respondents are “almost always 
represented” (15% self-represented at both mediation and at hearing).
141
 Arguably, the 
availability of online HRTO decisions provides access to justice.  
Proponents for access to online court documents also argue that “such openness would be 
beneficial to the media for accurate reporting.”
142
 However, the interests of journalism—such as 
government accountability and informing the public—can be achieved without having an entire 
court document available for view.
143
 The SCC held in Canadian Newspapers that, “while 
freedom of the press is nonetheless an important value in our democratic society … it must be 
recognized that the limits imposed by [prohibiting identity disclosure] on the media’s rights are 
minimal.”
144
 The media can still attend the hearing and report on the facts and trial.
145
 This case 
was decided in the context of a constitutional challenge to the provisions of the Criminal Code 
which anonymize the identities of sexual assault complainants.
146
 
Privacy advocates argue that private information should not be disclosed online because 
employers and rental or leasing agents could use this information to deny an individual 
employment or housing.
147
 Human rights applicants have a legitimate basis to be concerned 
regarding the disclosure of personal information to potential employers through online decisions. 
In a recent study commissioned by Microsoft, hundreds of recruiters, human resource 
professionals (HRPs), hiring managers, and consumers from four countries were interviewed 
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about the impact of online reputational information on hiring decisions.
148
 Of the 275 recruiters 
and HRPs surveyed from the United States, 75 per cent report that their companies require that 
hiring personnel conduct online searches of candidates through formal policies and 79 per cent 
check the online reputational data of job candidates.
149
 Eighty-nine per cent thought it was 
appropriate to consider professional online data in hiring decisions, whereas 84 per cent thought 
it was appropriate to consider personal online data.
150
 Seventy per cent had rejected one or more 
candidates due to information about the candidate found online.
151
 Forty per cent had rejected a 





Of concern are the lengths to which recruiters and HR professionals surveyed go in 
search of information as well as the types of information they are seeking. They are 
for the most part, comfortable searching for information that would be unethical or 
even illegal to ask a candidate to provide. ... Traditionally, recruiters have had clear 
restrictions on the types of information they can ask candidates. This included 
restrictions on asking about their families, their affiliation to religious, political or 
other groups, their financial situation, medical condition, and so on. Now recruiters 
can easily and anonymously collect information that they would not be permitted to 




Moreover, the recruiters and HRPs indicated that they believe the importance of “online 
reputational information will significantly increase in the next five years.”
154
  
In the context of online legal databases specifically, there is one documented case in 
Cincinnati of an individual who used Internet dockets to inform his hiring decisions.
155
 Based on 
information learned through court records posted online, he decided against hiring certain job 
applicants.
156
 Anecdotally, there is an understanding that Ontario employers and human resource 
managers are searching in CanLII.
157
  
Such emerging evidence is in direct contrast to the HRTO jurisprudence which dismisses 
concerns about disclosure of disability in public decisions posted online and the related risk to 
employment prospects.
158
 There is a similar disconnect between the number of consumers who 
believe that online reputation plays a role in hiring, and the current approaches of recruiters and 
HRPs. Only 7 per cent of the 335 United States consumers surveyed thought online data affected 
their job prospects.
159
 Despite this fact, the majority of consumers recognize the importance of 
                                                          
148
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managing their online identity as is demonstrated through the 79 per cent of consumers surveyed 
from the United States who took steps to separate their professional and personal online 
profiles.
160
 However, individuals are limited in their ability to manage their identity; “[i]n an 
Internet of infinite memory, where our “portraits” are amateurishly assembled in an online 





B. THE OPEN COURTS PRINCIPLE 
 
Scholars who advocate for increased access to public documents online argue that “[public] 
means public no matter the forum.”
162
 They argue that “because the public has a right to read, 
inspect, and copy documents at the courthouse,” the public should have the same right to access 
these documents online.
163
 The open courts principle, whose origins date back to as early as 
1685, is the “quasi-constitutional” principle that “court proceedings should be open and 
accessible.”
164
 The open courts principle is articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) in 
the two-part Dagenais/Mentuck test.
165 
Both Dagenais and Mentuck answered the question of 
when the Court should order publication bans, and both were decided in the criminal context.
166
 
The test articulated in Dagenais focused on balancing the accused’s right to a fair trial with the 
media’s right to freedom of expression.
167
 In Mentuck, the test in Dagenais was modified to 




A publication ban should only be ordered when: 
 
(a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to the proper 
administration of justice because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the 
risk; and 
                                                          
160
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(b) the salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects on the 
rights and interests of the parties and the public, including the effects on the right to 
free expression, the right of the accused to a fair and public trial, and the efficacy of 
the administration of justice.
169
    
 
As a part of the test, the Court must balance competing rights such as the right to a fair trial, 
privacy rights, and freedom of expression.
170
 As Fish J concluded in Toronto Star Newspapers 
Ltd v Ontario, 
 
...the Dagenais/Mentuck test applies to all discretionary court orders that limit 
freedom of expression and freedom of the press in relation to legal proceedings. 
Any other conclusion…would tend to undermine the open court principle… 




Public access will be barred only when the appropriate court, in the exercise of its 
discretion, concludes that disclosure would subvert the ends of justice or unduly 




The Dagenais/Mentuck test is applied in the HRTO context.
172
 The HRTO proceedings are open 
despite the “disadvantage,” or “inconveniences to the private persons whose conduct may be the 




C. THE IMPLICATIONS OF AB v BRAGG COMMUNICATIONS  
 
In the 2012 decision of AB v Bragg Communications (Bragg), the SCC prioritized privacy 
concerns in its application of the Dagenais/Mentuck test.
174
 The issue in Bragg was whether a 
fifteen year old cyberbullying victim could remain anonymous in an application requesting 
information from an Internet provider to use in an action for defamation.
175
 Someone had created 
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a fake Facebook profile for AB and she requested that the Internet provider reveal the IP address 
of the Internet user who had created the profile.
176
 Two media outlets opposed AB’s request for 
anonymity.
177
 Justice Abella, writing for the Court, held that an order allowing AB to proceed 
anonymously appropriately balanced AB’s interest in privacy and the media’s right to freedom 
of expression as the impact of prohibiting identity disclosure minimally impacts the rights of the 
media.
178
 A party’s identity has been described as a “[mere] … sliver of information” by the 
SCC in other circumstances where the open court principle was engaged.
179
     
The Court highlighted the importance of privacy;“[p]rivacy is recognized in Canadian 
constitutional jurisprudence as implicating liberty and security interests. In Dyment, the court 
stated that privacy is worthy of constitutional protection because it is ‘grounded in man’s 
physical and moral autonomy,’ is ‘essential for the well-being of the individual,’ and is ‘at the 
heart of liberty in a modern state.’”
180
 
The Bragg case actually turned on the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence of 
specific harm to make an order for anonymity.
181
 The SCC held that the lower courts had, “erred 
in failing to consider the objectively discernable harm to AB.”
182
 “[W]hile evidence of a direct, 
harmful consequence to an individual applicant is relevant, courts may also conclude that there is 
objectively discernable harm.”
183
 The Court can use “reason and logic” in the absence of 
“scientific or empirical evidence of the necessity of restricting access.”
184
 The Court referred to 
social science evidence and used common sense to determine that “young victims of sexualized 
[cyber]bullying are particularly vulnerable to the harms of revictimization upon publication.”
185
 
Though this case was about a minor who experienced sexual harassment it can be applied 
to a broader set of privacy concerns. Bragg stands for the proposition that there is flexibility 
within the Dagenais/Mentuck framework to protect special
186
 privacy concerns through 
anonymization and that this does not significantly impact on the media’s interest in openness. 
This supports the anonymization of human rights applications for individuals with concerns 
about disclosure of their disabilities. Bragg permits the HRTO to use reason and logic to 
determine whether an applicant would suffer harm without anonymization in the absence of 
empirical evidence.
187
 As such, notwithstanding the lack of empirical data showing that 
applicants who disclose their disability in a public decision suffer adverse consequences, based 
on what we do know about disability disclosure and the use of online searches in hiring as 
discussed above, and the presence of discrimination against people with disabilities in society in 
general, we can infer using reason and logic that some individuals with disabilities would suffer 
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harm if their disabilities are disclosed on CanLII. Moreover, as outlined below, the court has lost 
its ability to redact and control information in online decisions. Therefore, it is difficult to 
evaluate the full extent of the risk of harm of having an online decision disclosing one’s 
disability in the future.  
 
D. THE OPEN COURTS PRINCIPLE REVISITED IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
 
Legal scholars and authorities have questioned the applicability of the open courts principle in 
the digital age. The traditional scope of the principle was carved out when the courts had control 
over access to courthouses, physical court records, and hearings.
188
 The principle has since been 




We have lived in a very forgiving world. The “practical obscurity” of paper judicial 
records largely sheltered us from the danger of information misuse, while we prided 
ourselves on our “public” judicial system. The world of electronic information is a 
far less forgiving place. It is now forcing us to recognize—by our actions, if not yet 
by our words—that the simple abstract rules developed for a world of paper-based 
information may no longer suffice to resolve the complex problems of judicial 
information management. Courts have traditionally been vigilant in protecting 
individuals from the misuse of sensitive personal information. They must now rise to 
the difficult task of designing rules to protect litigants and third parties from cyber-
mischief and victimization. The failure of the legal system to maintain the ancient 
balance between access and privacy will lead to the greatest danger of all—inhibiting 




Eltis argues we should be re-thinking the importance of privacy and the disclosure of 
information in legal decisions in the cyber context.
191
 This includes how the judiciary frequently 
“pits privacy against the open court principle and accepts a culturally narrow view of what 
constitutes privacy and how it affects the judicial process.”
192
 Eltis highlights the differences 
between the former paper court records system, from which the open courts principle evolved, 
and the current system. Court records were once protected by the “practical obscurity” of the 
paper system.
193
 To obtain a court record, one had to physically relocate to the courthouse. 
Today individuals can access court and tribunal decisions online anonymously through databases 
                                                          
188
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such as CanLII. In addition, Eltis describes how our courts have shifted from “custodians of 
information” or “passive repositories” to “active publishers.”
194
  
Furthermore, courts are losing control over court documents and their ability to redact 
sensitive information.
195
 An example which readily demonstrates this point was when a man 
sued an Internet dating site because the site refused to delete postings from a former lover. The 
man had kept his sexual orientation private and his former lover revealed his identity and spread 
rumours about the man’s HIV status in the postings.
196
 The pleadings for the case were 
“automatically and instantaneously” posted online by the Court, including the damaging 
information which sparked the lawsuit in Israel.
197
 When the Judge attempted to redact the 
sensitive information, the original copy of the pleadings could not be removed from the Internet 
despite vigorous efforts.
198
 Another difference between the current system and the paper system 
is that the networked nature of the Internet increases vulnerability to cyberbullying and 




The previous Assistant Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Chantal Bernier, has taken the 
position that “unlimited disclosure of personal information” on the web exceeds the objectives 
which underlie the open courts principle such as tribunal accountability, legitimacy, and public 
trust in the legal system.
200
 “So rather than turning the light on the institution’s practices, it is 
turned on the parties, who become the subjects of idle curiosity or even voyeurism and malicious 
intent.”
201
 She cites the example of two individuals involved in a workplace arbitration over ten 
years prior whose identities continue to be “exclusively associated with the incident” through 
Internet searches.
202
   
Eltis investigates the history of our legal traditions surrounding privacy and the “open court 
principle.” She argues that the way in which privacy law developed in the common law tradition 
is inadequate to protect privacy rights in the cyber age. Eltis explains how the right to privacy in 
the English common law developed from the law of trespass and that “the right to privacy was 
first recognized by virtue of its intricate link to personal property.”
203
 In contrast, in French civil 
law, the right to privacy evolved as a “personality right.”
204
 A personality right is:  
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[A]n idea central to the civilian tradition but alien to the common law. What that 
means succinctly is that privacy attaches to persons rather than property, irrespective 
of property or special constraints. In other words, “Personality rights focus on the 
être—the being—in contrast with the avoir—the having” … and are therefore 
divorced from territory. Central among these personality rights is privacy, which in 




Civil law’s more flexible conception of privacy is better suited to protecting privacy rights 
in “intangible” and ever-evolving spaces like cyberspace.
206
 If the courts were to embrace this 
understanding of privacy rights, privacy could be seen as an “ally of accessibility.”
207
 In the 
current system, potential litigants may see the impact to their privacy and dignity rights as too 
great a transaction cost to pursue their claims.
208
 This is especially of concern in a legal system 




Despite problems outlined with the current application of the open court principle in the 
digital age, it is possible for privacy rights and the open court principle to co-exist.
210
 
Suggestions for reform could include a tiered approach: protective orders which result in total 
bans on dissemination and a lower standard which simply keeps documents offline, and 
reforming court rules to “reflect privacy interests.”
211
 Other options include the use of robot 
exclusion protocols or removing personal identifiers from decisions, methods used by CanLII 
and the Ontario Workplace and Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal (WSIAT) respectively.
212
 
Another option would be to provide individuals different levels of access to the information 
depending on their reasons for obtaining the information and these individuals would be subject 
to certain terms and conditions.
213
  
Dickson, the previous Privacy Commissioner of Saskatchewan, who has written about the 
relevance of the open courts principle to administrative tribunals in the digital age, recommends 
that administrative tribunals should consider using anonymized processes if they post decisions 
online.
214
 The HRTO is an administrative tribunal, not a court, and it may be argued that because 
of the administrative nature of HRTO decisions, the open courts principle should have less 
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applicability in the HRTO context.
215
 Dagenais and Mentuck came out of criminal law cases; not 
the administrative law context. The Human Rights Code is considered quasi-constitutional 
legislation and thus the HRTO may be considered more like a court on the spectrum between 
courts and administrative tribunals, but this does not necessarily mean that the open courts 
principle should apply with full force in HRTO decisions. Furthermore, the SCC’s decision in 
Bragg suggests that the HRTO should reconsider its application of Dagenais/Mentuck. 
Anonymization should be used as a tool to protect the privacy interests of certain vulnerable 
individuals, such as those who would choose not to stand up against discrimination if they had to 
publicly disclose their disabilities in the process. The media and the public still have access to 
the contents of the decision, resulting in an appropriate balance of competing rights. 
 
X. WHAT IS THE PRACTICE IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS AND 
TRIBUNALS? 
 
While the HRTO’s practice for issuing orders related to anonymity has been discussed, an 
interesting question to ask in making recommendations for reform is: how do the practices of the 
HRTO compare to the practices of other tribunals in Ontario with similar mandates and human 
rights tribunals in other jurisdictions?  
Social Justice Tribunals (SJTOs) in Ontario consist of the Child and Family Services 
Review Board (CFSRB), the Custody Review Board (CRB), the HRTO, the Landlord and 
Tenant Board, the Ontario Special Education Tribunals for both English and French, and the 
Social Benefits Tribunal.
216
 The legislative authority for the Social Justice Tribunal Cluster is the 
Adjudicative Tribunals Accountability, Governance and Appointments Act, 2009. The 
government can designate a cluster when “matters that the tribunals deal with are such that they 
can operate more effectively and efficiently as part of a cluster than alone.”
217
 The SJTO share 
the same mandate, mission and values including the following core values of accessibility: “We 
will strive to enhance full and informed participation of parties in the process, whether or not 
they have legal representation…We are committed to diversity and inclusiveness …. We will 




All of the Social Justice Tribunals with the exception of the HRTO use some form of 
anonymization process in all decisions. For example, CFSRB  pre-hearings and hearings are 
presumptively private.
219
 Its decisions on CanLII use initials to maintain this privacy.
220
 The 
                                                          
215
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CRB only provides samples of recommendations made by the Board on the CanLII website as 
examples of the sorts of questions raised in applications.
221
 These sample recommendations use 
“Young Person” in the place of an Applicant’s name.
222
 CRB hearings are presumed private (i.e. 
in the absence of the public).
223
 In the Special Education Board’s (SEB) decisions  all identifying 
information about the student is removed from the version of the decisions posted on CanLII.
224
 
Initials are used in the place of names.
225
 The anonymization procedures of the CFSRB, CRB 
and SEB are not surprising as the boards all involve decisions related to minors. Decisions of the 
Social Benefits Tribunal (SBT) are also private and confidential (i.e. not open to the public) as is 
mandated by statute and the decisions are anonymized.
226
 Anonymized decisions refer to the 
“Appellant” and are identified on CanLII using a docket number and legal citation.
227
  
Of the SJTO cluster, the Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) is arguably the most similar 
to the HRTO and significantly, the LTB has jurisdiction to consider some human rights matters 
related to housing.
228
 Decisions at the LTB are all anonymized for both the tenant and landlord. 
Decisions which are posted on CanLII are referred to by a docket number and legal citation. 
Landlords and tenants are referred to by initials in the decisions. The names of tenants will not be 
provided to members of the public even if they bring a request under the Freedom of Information 
and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA), whereas information about landlords may be provided.
229
 
Information about landlords including their name and address is not protected under FIPPA 
because they are acting in a “business capacity.”
230
 Names and addresses of tenants, on the other 
hand, are protected under FIPPA because they are considered personal information.
231
 The 
Consent and Capacity Board (CCB) also anonymizes decisions.
232
 This is the case even though 
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 Landlord and Tenant Board, “Making a Request for Information to the Board” (2008), online: 
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the hearings of the CCB are presumed to be public.
233
 In the Ontario employment law setting, the 
Workplace Safety and Insurance Board (WSIB) and WSIAT both anonymize decisions.
234
 
WSIAT removes information that could reveal the identity of the parties or witnesses and only 
provides the names of parties when there is a related civil case which is not anonymized.
235
 The 
WSIAT privacy policy holds that the “identity of the employer or worker is not necessary for 
ensuring that the public understands the reasons for Tribunal decisions and the principles of 
Workplace Safety and Insurance law.”
236
  
The Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB), which has the jurisdiction to hear human 
rights cases, by contrast “issues written decisions, which may include the name and personal 
information about persons appearing before it” available on CanLII.
237
 The OLRB hearings are 
public unless there is an issue of public security, or financial or personal matters if disclosure 
would “be damaging to any of the parties.”
238
 Some labour arbitrators have taken steps to avoid 
the disclosure of the griever’s identity in arbitration award decisions that reveal sensitive medical 
information about the griever.
239
 Among such cases are the use of initials to anonymize decisions 
related to mental health, alcoholism, or other sensitive medical information.
240
 However, there is 
not a consistent approach among labour arbitrators as the case of N v C reveals. In that award 
decision sensitive information pertaining to mental health is revealed and the identity of the 
grievor was not anonymized.
241
  
Other Human Rights Tribunals in the Canadian context take different approaches to 
anonymity. The Canadian Human Right Act provides that a Canadian Human Rights Tribunal 
can hold a public hearing subject to a confidentiality order in certain circumstances including 
where “there is a real and substantial risk that the disclosure of personal or other matters will 
cause undue hardship to the persons involved such that the need to prevent disclosure outweighs 
the societal interest that the inquiry be conducted in public.”
242
 An article by the author and 
Letheren only identified one decision in which the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal addressed 
confidentiality order issues. This case related to a parallel criminal proceeding.
243
 The Manitoba 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
workplace or employer’s name, and other personal identifiers have been omitted from all CCB Reasons for 
Decisions posted on CanLII.” Consent and Capacity Board, “Board’s Reasons For Decision” (2007), online: 
<ccboard.on.ca/scripts/english/legal/reasonsfordecisions.asp> [perma.cc/4U46-TM22]. 
233
 Ontario, Consent and Capacity Board, Rules of Practice, r 21.1, online: <ccboard.on.ca/english/legal/ 
documents/rulesofpractice.pdf> [perma.cc/3KLY-KPDC]. 
234
 CanLII, “Ontario – Ontario Workplace Safety and Insurance Board: Recent Decisions,” online: <www.canlii.org/ 
en/on/onwsib/> [perma.cc/B625-F7K3]; Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal, “Protecting Worker and 
Employer Privacy” online: <wsiat.on.ca/english/appeal/protectPrivacy.htm> [perma.cc/9F2K-PPGG] [WSIAT]. 
235









 Complex Services v Ontario Public Service Employees Union, Local 278, 2011 CanLII 26530 (ONLA); 
University Health Network v Ontario Public Service Employees Union, 2010 CanLII 14166 (ONLA); Dover Flour 





 N v C, 2010 CanLII 35849 (ONLA). 
242
 Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6 s. 52(1)(c). 
243
 Laurie Letheren & Natalie MacDonnell, supra note 113 at 13-14; W v W, 2006 CHRT 23 (CanLII). 
138





Human Rights Tribunal only has 33 written decisions published online. Out of those decisions, 
six were anonymized including three cases related to mental health (bipolar, addiction (two are 
decisions related to the same applicant)) and two cases related to physical disability (Hepatitis C 
and cancer). The sixth anonymized case was a sexual harassment case.
244
 Three other disability 
cases were not anonymized (involving wheelchair accessibility, back injury, and 
osteoporosis).
245
 In the case related to alcoholism the Manitoba Human Rights Commission 
asked the Manitoba Human Rights Board Of Adjudication that the complainant’s full name not 
be used because of the sensitive nature of the information. The respondent did not object.
246
 
The BCHRT is not consistent in its approach towards anonymity in cases of disability. 
The BCHRT has been, on occasion, receptive to arguments about the stigma of mental health 
disabilities and the impact of the publication of the applicant’s name in cases brought on the 
grounds of disability. This is demonstrated in a case where an applicant’s application was 
anonymized because he suffered from depression and alcoholism and expressed concern about 
the impact of the stigma on future employment and housing opportunities.
247
 In another case the 
BCHRT anonymized an application pertaining to a serious mental health disability to preserve 
the applicant’s medical privacy. In this case the applicant provided medical documentation that 
her identification in the decision could worsen her condition.
248
 In this case, the respondents 
requested that anonymization be extended to them and this was granted.
249
 In M v The 
University, where the applicant was concerned about the disclosure of her mental health 
condition and its impact on future career and employment, the applicant and respondent 
consented to “reciprocal limits” on disclosure.
250
 Finally, in another decision, the BCHRT 
anonymized the names of the parties, including an applicant with a mental health disability 
(addiction for 8 years) on its own initiative.
251
 
The BCHRT has also taken an approach less sensitive to disability privacy concerns and 
has held that the “hurt,” “stigma,” and “negative impacts” of disclosure of the applicant’s mental 
health disability are not enough to justify anonymity.
252
 In at least three decisions the BCHRT 
has made a point of highlighting the fact that it regularly publishes decisions which identify 
applicants with mental health disabilities including cases involving (1) mental health 
therapy/stress leave (2) stress leave/mental break down and (3) mental and physical health 
concerns resulting from an injury.
253
 
In sum, the HRTO stands out as the only SJTO which does not anonymize its decisions. 
This seems particularly striking considering that the SJTOs are moving towards common 
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 Moreover, its practices are out of step with the other Ontario tribunals 
examined here. Tribunals which deal with similar matters such as landlord tenant issues, 
employment and labour law at WSIB/WSIAT and capacity law at the CCB are anonymizing 
decisions routinely or frequently.   
Arguably this difference in approach stems from the nature of the HRTO; it differs from 
the other tribunals in that it is more similar to the civil law context where the parties are 
concerned about their reputation.
255
 Human rights are quasi-constitutional rights and “it is a 
serious matter to be accused of breaching the Code, which may also cause stress and stigma.”
256
 
The thought is that parties should not be able to bring an application and remain anonymous 
without good reasons.
257
 If the applicant brings allegations from “behind a veil,” why should the 
respondent not also remain anonymous?
258
 As a general proposition, respondents, like applicants, 
are not entitled to anonymity in the regular proceedings because of the open courts principle.
259
 
However, as is demonstrated in the BCHRT cases, anonymization of the respondent when an 
applicant wishes to remain anonymous may be one option to resolve the balancing between an 
applicant’s right to privacy and a respondent’s concern about openness.    
 
XI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPERCUSSIONS 
 
The findings of this article suggest that the HRTO has given insufficient weight to disability 
privacy concerns in its approach to anonymization. As is demonstrated through the literature, 
individuals with disabilities experience enough difficulties making day-to-day choices about 
disclosure at work, school and in social contexts. Requiring that an individual make a choice to 
disclose his or her disability on the internet to the entire public is too much to ask from 
individuals who we know choose not to disclose when they are not in safe spaces. Considering 
the nature of the Internet, the importance of one’s online information to employers, and concerns 
about loss of control over our Internet identities, the Internet is not a safe space to disclose. 
Individuals without concerns about disability are taking steps to separate their professional and 
personal information online. Individuals with disabilities who have concerns about disclosure of 
their disabilities should not have to make a choice between separating their professional and 
personal lives online and standing up to discrimination because the process results in online 
disclosure of their disability..
260
 
It is a very personal choice to disclose a disability. Similar arguments can be raised in 
support of anonymity for applicants alleging disability as those which have been raised in 
support of anonymity for applicants alleging sexual harassment or discrimination because of 
gender identity. There are similar issues at play related to “privacy and dignity interests,” 
impacts on “self-confidence,” “sense of self-worth” and “relationships with others,”,” as well as 
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how the disclosure of the applicant’s name could cause “ongoing pain and humiliation.”
261
 The 
OHRT has recognized stigma and prejudice as warranting anonymization in cases of HIV status 
and gender identity.
262
 Why is a general concern about stigma surrounding mental health or 
another disability not enough? As I have argued, if the Tribunal does not protect the identities of 
applicants in proceedings where they disclose their disability, applicants may be less likely to 
bring human rights applications.
263
 Recognition by the Tribunal in the context of sexual 
harassment applications that a failure to protect applicants’ anonymity is inconsistent with the 
purposes of the Code, should be extended to the disability context.264 The purpose of the Code is 
to promote equality and systemic change. Procedural reforms introduced in 2008 to create a 
direct access model were for the very purpose of promoting access to the Tribunal.
265
 The SCC 
also supports anonymization to encourage reporting and access to legal remedies.
266
 Eltis 
highlights how the common law tradition has failed to protect privacy rights in the digital age, 
but the HRTO has been willing to recognize privacy and dignity concerns in other contexts. It 
may be that Vice-Chairs do not fully understand the impact that disclosure of disability can have 
in a way that allows them to properly balance privacy concerns of individuals with disabilities 
with disclosure concerns against the importance of openness. Other administrative tribunals have 
done a much better job at protecting privacy concerns of individuals with disabilities and other 
privacy concerns through the use of initials or other anonymized processes.  
The HRTO’s current approach is incongruent with principles of human rights law. 
Employers must keep their employee’s disability confidential. Employers may only ask for 
limitations and restrictions of a disability, not a diagnosis. As it now stands, to obtain a remedy 
for discrimination on the ground of disability in the HRTO system, other than in exceptional 
cases, applicants have to disclose their disability in a public decision available online. Does this 
allow individuals with disabilities with disclosure concerns to obtain meaningful remedies for 
discrimination if the transaction costs to bringing an application are so high? Based on what we 
know about how and when individuals with disabilities choose to disclose, the HRTO approach 
is a deterrent to access to justice.  
 
A. RECOMMENDATION 1: WARNING TO APPLICANTS THAT 
DECISIONS ARE POSTED ONLINE 
 
First, it is important that applicants are aware that by pursuing a human rights application, the 
decision may be posted online. As discussed, applicants sign a declaration that they understand 
that their decision may become public through a written decision, hearing, or other Tribunal 
policies. However, there is no indication from the declaration itself that the written decision will 
be posted online. The declaration should be amended to inform applicants that all decisions 
(even interim decisions) are posted on CanLII. ARCH has recommended that a warning be 
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provided to the applicant in the application.
267
 This is beneficial for applicants who are self-
represented at any stage of the process, as it is best for an applicant to request an order for 
anonymity prior to the posting of any interim decisions.  
 
B. RECOMMENDATION 2:  INTERIM DECISIONS SHOULD BE 
ANONYMIZED  
 
As a further option, ARCH has recommended that interim decisions be anonymized and the issue 
of anonymity argued fully at the hearing stage.
268
 There could be a mechanism to request 
anonymity at the same time as filing the application and the threshold for obtaining anonymity 
could be lower at this juncture when compared to a full hearing.
269
 This would protect applicants 
from disclosure in a summary hearing decision or other interim decisions.
270
 Not all motions for 
summary hearings involve written decisions made by the HRTO but this would provide a layer 
of protection for applicants whose cases meet the threshold for a full written summary 
decision.
271
 This would allow applicants to access the benefits of private settlements without 
having to endure public disclosure of their disability. 
 
C. RECOMMENDATION 3: OVERHAUL OF SYSTEM FOR ORDERS OF 
ANONYMITY 
 
There are various options for overhauling the current system to make the human rights system 
more accessible to individuals with disabilities with disclosure concerns. All options would 
allow the applicant to choose to be identified by name in the public decision. The application 
could contain a box where an applicant could state his or her preference. This would also draw 
attention to the fact that anonymous and redacted processes exist for the self-represented 
applicant. 
 
1. PRESUMPTION OF ANONYMITY 
 
A rule similar to Rule 3.11.1 (for minors) could be implemented for individuals with disabilities 
who wish to remain anonymous. The application form could be modified to include two options 
for the application to choose from “I wish to remain anonymous” or “I wish be identified by 
name in the public decision”. The applicant would indicate his or her choice. If the applicant 
chose to remain anonymous there would be a presumption that the applicant’s choice would be 
respected. A sample Rule could read: “Unless otherwise ordered, the HRTO will use initials in 
its decisions to identify individuals with disabilities who request anonymization”.  
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2. CHANGES TO THE HRTO’S BALANCING OF PRIVACY INTERESTS RELATED TO 
DISCLOSURE OF DISABILITY  
 
Another option would be for the HRTO to develop a new jurisprudence for anonymization of 
applicants with disabilities that is similar in keeping with cases involving sexual harassment, 
sexual orientation, or gender identity. The HRTO could rely on the privacy and dignity concerns 
raised by the applicant. Applicants with disabilities deserve access to the same set of 
presumptions and processes for anonymity as applicants with these other disclosure concerns. 
The HRTO does not need legislative intervention to reform its practices. Under the Code the 
HRTO is granted the power to “may make rules governing the practice and procedure before 
it.”
272
 Rule 3.11 provides the HRTO with the power to make orders for anonymity “where it 
considers it appropriate to do so.”
273
 The HRTO could also consider an approach to privacy law 
more similar to that found in the civil law tradition based on personality rights and dignity as 
recommended by Eltis. 
 
3. ANONYMIZE ONLINE DECISIONS, IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION AVAILABLE AT 
THE HRTO  
 
A third option would be to anonymize applicants’ information online and have full decisions, 
including the names of the applicants, available at the HRTO (or other physical location). This 
would provide applicants with the same “practical obscurity” which was previously available to 
litigants before the transition to the digital age. A foreseeable problem with this approach is that 
information obtained from the HRTO could be circulated online which would undermine the 
return to “practical obscurity.” A potential solution could be requiring that individuals who wish 
to access non-redacted documents at the HRTO’s physical offices agree to certain terms and 
conditions for their use.
274
    
 
D. IMPACT TO SYSTEM AND WEIGHING OF REFORM OPTIONS 
 
What would the repercussions be of providing anonymity to more applicants? If applicants could 
choose whether to remain anonymous or could obtain orders for anonymity more easily, it may 
be difficult to use strategies such as press releases for public education purposes which involve 
publicizing information about the case and the applicant. An example of such a case was the 
mediated settlement where taxi companies in Toronto agreed to stop charging extra fees to 
passengers who use wheelchairs.
275
 The HRLSC and ARCH are pushing against traditional 
minutes of settlement with non-disclosure clauses which prevent the applicant from telling his or 
her story.
276
 However, the types of cases in which applicants opt to remain anonymous may not 
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be the types of cases where applicants feel comfortable in the media spotlight for the same 
reasons they do not wish to have a public decision disclosing their disability. In addition, in 
many instances, disclosure of identity would not be required in order for the applicant to tell their 
story. Therefore, there may not be much potential for public education lost through this reform.  
Would a presumption of ordering anonymity or a shift in jurisprudence which routinely 
provides anonymity to applicants with disabilities who request to remain anonymous play into 
the very stigma that the applicant is trying to avoid? The reform options outlined above are 
premised on the view that applicants should be able to choose whether to remain anonymous. 
ARCH recognizes the tension that exists in encouraging applicants to use anonymous processes 
to address human rights concerns and their mandate to “empowe[r] people with disabilities” and 
educate the public about disability rights.
277
 Tied into this issue is the concept of Disability Pride. 
Sarah Triano, a leader in the disability community has defined Disability Pride as follows:  
 
Disability Pride represents a rejection of the notion that our physical, sensory, 
mental, and cognitive differences from the non-disabled standard are wrong or bad in 
any way, and is a statement of our self-acceptance, dignity and pride. It is a public 
expression of our belief that our disabilities are a natural part of human diversity, a 
celebration of our heritage and culture, and a validation of our experience. Disability 
Pride is an integral part of movement building, and a direct challenge to systemic 
ableism and stigmatizing definitions of disability. It is a militant act of self-
definition, a purposive valuing of that which is socially devalued, and an attempt to 
untangle ourselves from the complex matrix of negative beliefs, attitudes, and 
feelings that grow from the dominant group’s assumption that there is something 
inherently wrong with our disabilities and identity.
278
        
 
I do not see my proposed model for reform (an individual choice model) at odds with the 
concept of Disability Pride; to me they are not mutually exclusive. The individual choice model 
allows individuals to self-identify in the decision. Any one particular decision by an individual to 
disclose or not to disclose is not an indication that someone does or do not feel or identify with 
Disability Pride: it is a calculated decision related to many factors including social and economic 
impacts. Further, as a study by Malhotra and Rowe suggests, the way that individuals with 
disabilities understand their disabilities in relation to their “sense of self” may vary, for example 
“depending on the social context … [and] how they [are] treated and perceived by others.”
279
 
“When the participants felt scrutinized or when they faced barriers, their identities as disabled 
people became more pronounced but in other circumstances, their impairment was often seen as 
largely irrelevant, something that contributed to who they were over their life but did not 
comprise the entirety of their identity within the specific moment..[being a person with a 
disability] could be both a sometimes unpleasant or painful experience and also a source of 
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 The study participants displayed a range in how they identified with their disability: 
“[s]ome almost always identified their self with a disability identity and found great pride and 
motivation in that identity while others wished to distance themselves from disability and felt 
that their impairment was more often something that prevented others from seeing their true, 
“core” selves than something which contributed positively to who they were ... .”
281
 In the view 
of ARCH, the disability community would be receptive to an argument for reform that prioritizes 
the choice of individuals with disabilities to disclose their disability.
282
 It takes the position that 




The problem with the HRTO’s current approach is that by imposing disclosure on 
individuals with disabilities a segment of the population is potentially left unprotected from 
human rights abuses. The jurisprudence shows that individuals with disabilities are in at least 
some cases asking to remain anonymous and my experiences at the HRLSC and those of ARCH 
suggest that anonymity factors into the cost benefit analysis of applicants on whether to file a 
human rights application. To leave certain individuals with disabilities without recourse against 
discrimination would not be a step towards combating stigma and discrimination; this would 
serve only to leave such stigma and discrimination intact. In my opinion, an applicant’s choice to 
remain anonymous in this context is not stigmatizing in itself. Anonymization is not the source 
of stigma; it is society and its structural economic, social, and political forces that sustain 
disability. It would be unfair for the HRTO to impose disclosure on individuals in the name of 
the de-stigmatization of society. The purpose of the Code is to provide Ontarians with equal 
treatment and freedom from harassment in essential areas of their lives. I recognize that when an 
individual with a disability steps forward and tells their story this can help to reduce stigma and 
breakdown stereotypes. While the goal of reducing stigma in society is an honourable one, it 
should not trump the goal of providing all Ontarians with accessible remedies under the Code, 
which exist to reduce discrimination and stigma. The decision to disclose in an HRTO 
decision—a particularly high stakes form of discrimination—represents only one of many, many 
decisions that an applicant will make about disclosure over the course of their lifetime. 
Individuals with disabilities can continue to tell their stories to stand up to stigma and stereotypes 
inside and outside of the HRTO forum whether they self-identify or remain anonymous, with or 
without the support of advocates but the individual’s decision to disclose needs to remain within 
that individual’s control.     
Opponents to reform may be concerned that more vexatious litigants would bring cases 
because they would remain free from public scrutiny. Letheren does not believe that this type of 
reform would encourage vexatious litigants, as in her experience those types of litigants are those 
that want their name to be publicly acknowledged.
284
 Even if vexatious cases increased as a 
result of this change, the HRTO has the responsibility to sort out the meritorious cases from 
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 These tools exist such as the mechanism for summary hearing.
286
 
It is possible that some respondents might disagree with reform. It is clear from my survey 
of the jurisprudence that respondents sometimes oppose anonymization of the applicant. 
However, applicants are not the only ones to bring motions to anonymize the identity of the 
applicant. In one case a respondent requested that the applicant be identified by “M” because 
they wished to call a psychiatrist from the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health who would 
provide evidence of a sensitive nature and felt that anonymity would better serve the applicant’s 
privacy interests.
 287
  Respondents have also consented to anonymization in certain cases.
288
   
As disability cases make up the majority of the current human rights caseload, 
implementing any of these options for anonymity of applications on the ground of disability 
could change the human rights system significantly, depending on how many applicants chose to 
use anonymous processes. It may be argued that other Code grounds also deserve the protection 
of anonymity so we should extend reforms to all applicants. Each Code ground is unique and 
may have its own anonymity concerns. However, conclusions will not be drawn in regards to 
other grounds in this article as its focus is on the ground of disability which has special privacy 
concerns related to disclosure. There is also an impact of bringing a human rights case to one’s 
reputation generally, which could be another rationale to extend reforms to all applicants. Those 
searching legal databases will know who is willing to stand up to an employer, landlord, or 
service provider. The whistleblower implications of bringing a human rights case are also a 
deterrent to filing. There is also the fact that individuals who experience discrimination must 
describe the impact of the discrimination on their physical, emotional and mental health as a part 
of proving that they should be awarded compensation for “injury to dignity, feelings and self-
respect.”
289
 This could also give rise to similar privacy concerns to those discussed in this article.   
In my opinion, the best reform would be to provide a presumption for anonymity in all 
cases of disability where the applicant wished to remain anonymous. The option of having the 
unredacted version of the decision available at the HRTO would likely involve the use of too 
many resources. I am not of the opinion that developing HRTO jurisprudence in a similar way as 
cases involving sexual harassment or gender identity is the best option as it takes control over the 
decision to disclose away from of the applicant with the disability. If the HRTO were to pursue 
this option the HRTO would need to completely reform its understanding of disability disclosure. 
The HRTO would need to abandon its current approach in which it requires applicants to raise 
“unique concerns or issues of confidentiality” or involve “exceptional circumstances.”
290
 The 
HRTO would need to develop the jurisprudence in a way that allows the typical case where an 
individual has concerns with disclosure as meriting an order of anonymity and which recognizes 
the social and economic repercussions of disclosure.       
The presumption of anonymity could be implemented by creating a set of checkboxes on 
the application form for the applicant to indicate their wishes and the form would inform 
applicants of the online nature of decisions. This would leave the option for individuals with 
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disabilities who want to self-identify to do so, giving control to the particular applicant to make 
the decision and provide the applicants with the requisite information to make an informed 
choice about what a public decision entails in the HRTO context. A presumption of anonymity 
would provide clarity and reassurance to applicants with disabilities who may otherwise be 
deterred in filing an application that they would remain anonymous. Respondents would regain a 
right to argue that the applicant should be identified in the decision (as in the case of minors) but 




The HRTO’s approach to anonymization of applications brought on the ground of disability 
should be reformed. The HRTO’s current approach to anonymization is insensitive to applicants’ 
concerns surrounding disclosure of disability which in turn, may impact on applicants’ 
willingness to file applications. The HRTO’s approach is also disconnected from our transition 
into the digital age. This argument is advanced based on an understanding of the HRTO’s current 
approaches to ordering anonymity developed through primary research, social science pertaining 
to disclosure of disability, a critique of the HRTO’s reliance on the open courts principle, and a 
survey of approaches to anonymization by other tribunals in Ontario and other jurisdictions and 
the SCC. It is also informed by my experiences at the HRLSC and my collaborations with Laurie 
Letheren at ARCH. Applicants should be forewarned that HRTO decisions are posted on CanLII 
and there should be a presumption of anonymity where an applicant with a disability chooses to 
remain anonymous. This would reduce the high transaction cost that the system currently places 
on applicants with disability disclosure concerns to access justice against discrimination and 
respect the autonomy of an applicant to make his/her own decision regarding the disclosure of 
her/his disability. This article’s scope is limited to the ground of disability but a topic for further 
research is whether applicants bringing applications under other protected grounds should have a 
choice to remain anonymous in HRTO decisions. This is a contemporary topic given the 




Since the primary research for this article was completed in March 11, 2014, five additional 
relevant cases were released.
291
 In G v P a concern about being labelled as mentally ill was not 
sufficient for anonymization.
292
 Anonymization was granted in the cases of DG and AG.
293
 In 
DG, the respondent did not oppose and the case involved sensitive medical information about 
mental health including depression and anxiety.
294
 In AG the application involved sensitive 
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health information and the respondents did not oppose.
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